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ABSTRACT
We study a model designed to understand the concept of unbalanced growth. We define leading
sectors to be those that raise the profits from industrialization for other sectors the most. We identify
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We study a model designed to understand the concept of unbalanced
growth. We deﬁne leading sectors to be those that raise the proﬁts from
industrialization for other sectors the most. We identify the leading sectors
and show that subsidizing them in sequence will raise welfare if the future
is not discounted too strongly.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In the post World War II decades, much attention was directed to the problem of
development. Why, it was asked, did some countries develop and others, which
looked quite similar, did not? The obvious answer seemed to be that there
were alternative routes any given economy could take. Two distinct schools of
thought emerged.
Rosenstein-Rodan [10], along with Nurkse [9], Scitovsky [11], and Fleming
[3], argued that there was a vicious circle present. Firms did not industrialize
because there was no market for their goods and there was no market for their
goods because income was low and income was low because ﬁrms did not in-
dustrialize. This kind of low-level equilibrium, it was argued, could be broken
∗Comments from two referees and the editor are gratefully acknowledged. Research support
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1by the simultaneous industrialization of a large part of the economy. Failure to
industrialize is seen in essence as a coordination problem. This has come to be
called the “big push”o r“ balanced growth”d o c t r i n e .
On the other hand, the “unbalanced growth” camp led by Albert O. Hirschman
[4], while agreeing on the existence of a vicious circle, argued that industrial-
ization of certain “leading” sectors would pull along the rest of the economy.
Hirschman’s discussion of “backward”a n d“ forward” linkages was an integral
part of this analysis. These refer to the eﬀects of one investment on the prof-
itability of investment at earlier and later stages of production. Investment by
a ﬁrm can, through forward linkages, motivate investment by another ﬁrm that
uses the ﬁrst ﬁrm’s output as an input. Similarly, through backward linkages,
one ﬁrm’s investment can motivate another ﬁrm, which provides inputs to the
ﬁrst ﬁrm, to invest. Instead of industrializing a large number of sectors, he
argued that what was needed was the industrialization of the “leading” sectors.
Then, through backward and forward linkages these sectors would spark the
industrialization of the rest of the economy. Thus, growth is unbalanced as it
does not occur everywhere, only in certain sectors, which then pull others along.
These ideas, although highly inﬂuential in the 1950s, lost much of their
appeal in later decades. Krugman [6] argues that this fall from grace stemmed
from the fact that the ideas lacked formalization. He says:
“Like it or not, however, the inﬂuence of ideas that have not been embalmed
in models soon decays. And this was the fate of high development theory.
Myrdal’s eﬀective presentation of the idea of circular and cumulative processes,
or Hirschman’s evocation of linkages, were stimulating and immensely inﬂuential
in the 1950s and early 1960s. By the 1970s..., they had come to seem not so
much wrong as meaningless. What were these guys talking about? Where were
their models? And so high development theory was not so much rejected as
2simply bypassed.”
It was only in the late 80s and early 90s, beginning with the work of Murphy,
Shleifer, and Vishny [8] (MSV from here on), that formal models which address
some of these issues were introduced. MSV’s paper delineated the conditions
under which the balanced growth doctrine might apply. They show that an
industrializing ﬁrm must be able to aﬀect aggregate income through more than
just its proﬁts if the balanced growth approach is to be warranted. The idea
is very simple. Aggregate income is composed of wage income and proﬁts. A
ﬁrm can acquire a better technology (an act we call industrialization) by paying
a ﬁxed cost. Initially aggregate income is too low, thereby demand is too low,
making industrialization unproﬁtable. In their basic model there is no role
for government to spark oﬀ self-sustaining industrialization by a “big push.”
The reason is that if industrialization is not privately proﬁtable, it must reduce
income in the aggregate when undertaken. This then reduces demand for other
ﬁrms thereby reducing their motivation to industrialize.
For government intervention to be desirable, a ﬁrm’s industrialization must
increase aggregate income, even though its proﬁts are negative. In this event it
is possible that after a number of sectors have industrialized, aggregate demand
may have increased enough to make industrialization proﬁtable for other sectors.
If proﬁts are the only way a ﬁrm’s industrialization aﬀects aggregate income,
then this is not possible. In their paper MSV look at three ways in which a ﬁrm’s
industrialization may aﬀect aggregate income: (1) wage diﬀerentials between
sectors, (2) an inter-temporal model that shifts income between periods, and
(3) reductions in cost through investment in infrastructure.
In the literature, the focus has been on balanced rather than unbalanced
growth. Models along the lines of those developed by MSV are not suited to
exploring the ideas that lie behind unbalanced growth. In their models, all ﬁrms
3are alike and the only issue is whether it is possible for industrialization by
one ﬁrm to create spillovers in demand for other ﬁrms through an increase in
aggregate income.1 In the words of Streeten [13]:
“Insofar as unbalance does create desirable attitudes, the crucial question is
not whether to create unbalance, but what is the optimum degree of unbalance,
where to unbalance and how much, in order to accelerate growth; which are the
“growing points,” where should the spearheads be thrust, on which slope would
snowballs grow into avalanches?”
In the same vein Bardhan [1] says:
“From the policy point of view the new literature on learning and strategic
complementarities, like the earlier development literature on externalities, un-
derestimates the diﬃculty of identifying the few sectors and locations where the
spillover eﬀects may be large ... .”
In contrast to MSV, our model is structured to shed light on these key ques-
tions. We consider an economy with a hierarchy of goods. Only the good at the
top of the hierarchy is consumed. Each good uses the good below it in the hierar-
chy, as well as labor, as inputs. The vertical structure of the model implies that
a cost reduction at any stage reduces the price of the ﬁnal good and increases
its demand. Consequently, the derived demand for all intermediates rises and
this increase in their demand shifts the change in proﬁts from industrialization
at any stage upwards. Linkages are related to the extent by which industrial-
ization by a sector aﬀects the proﬁtability of industrialization of sectors above
and below it. If forward linkages and backward ones are equally strong, then a
parallel shift occurs. If forward linkages are stronger than backward linkages,
the change in proﬁts from industrialization shift up more for goods downstream
1To be fair, the third model analyzed by MSV does consider the role of infrastructure, an
input, on proﬁtability of investment by other identical ﬁrms. However, it is not formulated to
answer the key questions regarding unbalanced growth.
4from the sector and less for ﬁrms upstream from it.2
The model presented here ﬁts squarely into the complementarities and cu-
mulative processes literature. The acquisition, by a sector, of better technology
translates into a lower price for the consumption good and a corresponding
increase in demand for other sectors’ output. This makes their potential in-
vestments more proﬁtable. Because of ﬁxed costs associated with the new tech-
nology, no ﬁrm acting independently ﬁnds it proﬁtable to invest. Investment
complementarities are not taken advantage of, and the vicious circle of low
demand-no investment-low demand becomes an underdevelopment trap. But,
as Matsuyama [7] in his excellent survey of the complementarities literature3
points out:
“...the circularity does not always imply a vicious circle. If the economy
acquires more than a critical mass of support industries, the very fact that the
relation is circular generates a virtuous circle.”
The unbalanced growth approach is based on the idea that industrializing
the “leading” sectors is the most eﬃcient way to reach this critical mass and
turn a vicious circle into a virtuous one.
The structure of our model resembles that of MSV and is a combination of a
vertical structure similar to the vertical complementarities model in Matsuyama
[7] and the investment with start-up costs model in Shleifer [12]. However, our
model is designed to address a diﬀerent set of questions.
We deﬁne the leading sector to be the one whose investment has the largest
2The issue of where linkages are the strongest is where the consumer good-oriented growth
camp and the heavy industry-oriented growth camp diﬀer. However, linkages may well have
been strongest upstream for a large, relatively closed economy, like India in the 60’s, which
produced many of the intermediates it used, while they may well have been strongest down-
stream for a smaller, more open economy. Hence, both camps could have been correct, but
for diﬀerent countries!
3His survey is strictly about complementarities in models with monopolistic competition.
Although our model does not involve monopolistic competition the complementarities are
exactly those his paper surveys.
5positive eﬀect on other sectors’ decision to invest. Since the change in the
incentive to invest comes from the eﬀect on the ﬁnal goods cost, this boils down
to identifying the sector whose industrialization reduces the cost of the ﬁnal
good the most. We ﬁnd that when sectors use each other’s outputs as inputs
relatively intensively (our intermediate input parameter γ>1) then the leading
sector tends to be the sector farthest upstream. Conversely, low intensity use
of other’s output implies the leading sector is downstream.4
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we lay out the basic
model. Section 3 deals with the eﬀects of industrialization as a function of where
it occurs in the hierarchy. This identiﬁes the leading sectors depending on the
extent of the linkages between sectors. Section 4 asks whether subsidization can
create a virtuous circle where initial subsidization sparks self-sustaining indus-
trialization. While industrialization by any sector always helps other sectors,
small positive eﬀects need not spark oﬀ industrialization of the entire economy.
We ﬁnd that the extent of cost savings together with the extent of linkages de-
termine whether self-sustaining industrialization can occur. Then we ask how
subsidization can improve welfare and when a case can be made for subsidiza-
tion. Section 5 provides some concluding remarks.
2T h e B a s i c M o d e l
We will ﬁrst set out the model in the absence of any decisions about investment
and consider these issues in the following section. On the demand side, we have
a representative agent setup. The utility function of this agent is given by:
U(T,Z)=T εZ1−ε
4In a more general model where the input output relations are more diﬀuse other factors
like the share in cost of an intermediate good in the cost of ﬁnal goods will come into play.
6where Z is produced by using a unit of labor alone. The production process of
T is more complicated. The ﬁnal good T is the culmination of the hierarchical
production process discussed above. We assume that there are T +1steps
involved in making T. A unit of T requires γ units of the good directly below
it in the hierarchy, indexed by T − 1, as well as a unit of labor. Thus, T is
produced in the T +1stage of the process. The intermediate good indexed
by 0 is at the bottom of the hierarchy and just requires a unit of labor for its
production.
As we assume perfect competition, price equals cost. Taking Z as the nu-
meraire good, since the price of Z equals its cost:
p(Z)=1=w. (1)
Throughout we will use p(j) and c(j) to denote the price and cost of good j.
We also have that the price of intermediate good 0 equals its cost:
p(0) = c(0) = w =1 . (2)
From the technology assumed:
c(t)=γc(t − 1) + w (3)







for γ 6=1 , and:
c(t)=wt + w (5)
for γ =1 .N o t e t h a t c(t) must increase in t since goods higher up in the
hierarchy are necessarily more expensive to produce and must cost more. c(t)
is linear in t if γ =1 , lies above the γ =1cost function when γ>1, and below
7it when γ<1.I n t u i t i v e l y ,c rises faster with t as the linkage between the goods
in the hierarchy, γ,r i s e s .c(t) is depicted in Figure 1.5 For simplicity we draw
all functions as continuous on t.










=( 1 − ε)L,
where L denotes the labor endowment and Y national income. Of course, Y =








as price equals cost. Similarly,





Dt depends on the price of the ﬁnal good alone because of the Leontieﬀ tech-
nology. Note that Dt increases in t for γ<1 and decreases in t for γ>1.T h e
demand for all the inputs stems ultimately from the demand for the ﬁnal good
at the top of the hierarchy. From (8) it is clear that if γ>1, then market size
falls as t rises. If γ<1, market size rises as t rises. When γ =1market size is
ﬁxed. Figure 2 depicts Dt.6
5The reader may prefer to think of (3) as a ﬁrst order diﬀerence equation. Shocks are
propagated along the sectoral structure of the economy according to γT−t. They are ampliﬁed
forward if γ>1 and backwards if γ<1.
6One might suspect that the market size eﬀect is driving the results. However, adjusting
market size to be equal at all stages does not alter our results. See [5] for details.
83 Industrialization
We assume that consumers cannot save and hence spend all their income in
each period. The future, containing an inﬁnite number of periods, is discounted
by all agents according to the discount factor δ. For each good/sector t there
exists a technology that reduces marginal cost by reducing the direct labor input
requirement from 1 to 1/θ where θ>1.I ta l s or e q u i r e sF units of labor as a
setup cost. We assume that this technology is non-appropriable by others for one
time period. The act of adopting this new technology is called industrialization.
We assume that in each period, industrialization can occur in at most one
sector. If more than one sector is willing to industrialize, then the sector with
the most to gain is assumed to industrialize. If more than one sector innovated
in a time period, or if proﬁts persisted for more than a single period, expecta-
tions about other ﬁrms’ behavior would become important for each potential
innovator’s proﬁts. The behavior of other ﬁrms would aﬀect p(T), and hence
the demand for each input during a time frame relevant for the proﬁts of ﬁrms
considering industrialization. In such a setting, multiple equilibria based on
expectations about other ﬁrms’ behavior could occur. Such multiplicity is well
understood, see for example, Shleifer [12], and the excellent survey by Mat-
suyama [7], and is deliberately ruled out in this paper.
There are a number of ﬁrms who compete in price in each sector with each
ﬁrm selling a homogeneous product. At most one ﬁrm in a sector will choose to
industrialize. The industrializing ﬁrm then chooses to price at the cost of non-
industrializing ﬁrms as the elasticity of the demand curve it is facing is less than
unity.7 In the following period, other ﬁrms can freely access the technology and
7Dt(p(t)) = γT−tDT(p(T)) so that the elasticity of demand for good t equals the elasticity
of demand for the ﬁn a lg o o dt i m e st h er a t i oo ft h ep e r c e n t a g ei n c r e a s ei np(T) relative to the
percentage increase in p(t). The former is unity as utility takes a Cobb Douglas form, and the
latter is less than unity as the ﬁnal good price increases less than proportionately relative to
that of any intermediate input since any intermediate input has a cost share less than unity.
9competition dissipates all proﬁts. However, although proﬁts go to zero after the
ﬁrst period of innovation, the eﬀects of the innovation remain and are perceived
by other ﬁrms through an increase in demand as a result of a lower price for
good T.
We will distinguish between three things: 1. The sector’s incentive to indus-
trialize which is related to its proﬁts from doing so. 2. The eﬀects a sector’s
industrialization has on sectors above and below it in the hierarchy of produc-
tion, i.e., the extent of its forward and backward linkages. 3. The identity of
the leading sector. This is the sector whose industrialization has the largest
eﬀect on the industrialization choice of other sectors. Since these eﬀects operate
via the price of the ﬁnal good, this is the sector whose industrialization has the
largest eﬀect on the cost of the ﬁnal good.
3.1 The Gains from Industrialization.
We need an expression for the change in proﬁts of a ﬁrm, indexed by t,i fi t
decided to industrialize when no other ﬁrm had industrialized. We will assume
that these proﬁts are below zero to start with so that no ﬁrm chooses to in-
dustrialize when no industrialization has occurred. Following that we examine
how t’s proﬁts from industrialization are aﬀected by industrialization of sectors
above and below it in the hierarchy.
Given our model, a ﬁrm will choose to industrialize if its current variable
proﬁts exceed F.D e ﬁne c(t|B) to be the cost of producing a unit of t when all the
sectors in the set B have industrialized but no one in sector t has industrialized.
Similarly, cI(t|B) is the cost of producing a unit of t when t has industrialized
as well as all sectors in the set B.W e w i l l d e n o t e b y c(t) and cI(t) the case
where B = φ, the empty set. pI(t|B) and p(t|B) can be similarly deﬁned with
p(t) and pI(t) again denoting the case where B is the empty set.
10If a ﬁrm in sector t is the ﬁrst to industrialize, it has marginal costs given
by:




where c(t − 1) is deﬁned by (3). It also incurs a ﬁxed cost given by F.S i n c e
it chooses to price as high as it can, as argued earlier, it prices at its com-
petitors’ cost, c(t).I t s p r o ﬁt from industrializing (in the period in which its




























Proposition 1 If γ<1, then the sector with the greatest incentive to indus-
trialize is the one furthest downstream. If γ>1, it is the one furthest
upstream. If γ =1 , all sectors have the same incentive to industrialize.
Proof From equations (10) and (11) it follows that products with larger de-
mands have a greater incentive to industrialize as the ﬁxed cost can be
spread over a larger number of units. Figure 3 depicts πI(t) for these three
cases.
The gains from industrialization initially lie strictly below zero as we assume
no industrialization occurs without intervention of some kind.
8Assume that ﬁrms do not take into account the eﬀect of their proﬁts on aggregate income
would not aﬀect the spirit of the results that follow.
9Note that we assume that
aγT−tεL
p(T) − F<0 which implies 1 −
aγT−tε
p(T) > 0 since L>F.
113.2 Industrialization and the Gains from Industrialization.
Here, we consider the eﬀects of industrialization of a group of sectors on the
change in proﬁts from industrialization of the remaining sectors. We need to
distinguish two distinct eﬀects. When a ﬁrm industrializes it makes proﬁts
(positive or negative) in the period in which it industrializes. This change
in proﬁts aﬀects income, and hence the potential change in proﬁts of other
ﬁrm’s in that same period. This eﬀect we call the impact eﬀect. Note that
like in MSV, if it is not proﬁtable for a sector to industrialize on its own,
then its industrialization must have a negative impact eﬀect. In the period
of industrialization, there is no price change, and if proﬁts are negative, income
is reduced by industrialization.
In the next period the rest of the sector acquires the technology and price
falls. This reduction in price, as a result of better technology, increases demand
and therefore increases the potential change in proﬁts for other ﬁrms not yet
industrialized. We call this the long-run eﬀect. While impact eﬀects are just as
in MSV, the long-run eﬀects are new.
Recall equation (11) and note that industrialization by any ﬁrm t reduces
the price of good t in the following period. This, in turn, reduces the cost, and
price, of the ﬁnal good and raises the quantity demanded. This feeds back to the
demand for all the intermediate goods in the hierarchy. The “leading sector”
is that sector which has the largest eﬀect on the gains from industrialization of
other sectors. From equation (11) it is obvious that the leading sector must be
the sector that lowers p(T|B) the most. This will depend on the value of γ.
3.2.1 γ =1
In this case, industrialization of any ﬁrm anywhere in the hierarchy shifts all
gains from industrialization up equally. Because γ =1there is neither dilution
12nor magniﬁcation of this eﬀect as we move upstream or downstream. In essence,
a unit of the ﬁnal good requires a unit of each of the intermediate goods. Thus,
industrialization of any sector has the same eﬀect on the change in proﬁts of
any un-industrialized ﬁrm. This implies that in this case there is no such thing
as a leading sector.








Also, p(T)=T +1and if any n of T +1rungs in the hierarchy industrialize
the price of the ﬁnal good is given by:
p(T|n)=T +1− na.
Therefore, p(T) depends only on the extent of industrialization and not the
location of the industrializing ﬁrms in the hierarchy. This case is depicted in
Figure 4. πI(t|n) is a horizontal line which shifts up proportional to the extent of
industrialization as shown. Once a certain threshold amount of industrialization
has occurred, all remaining industrialization takes place automatically, i.e., it is
self sustaining. This threshold is the smallest n for which πI(t|n) exceeds zero.
When γ =1all sectors are equally good candidates for leading sectors. Note
that, it is possible to have self-sustaining industrialization once a threshold level
is crossed yet no industrialization occurs in the absence of intervention.
There is a strong similarity between this case and MSV. Here, every sector
is identical to any other sector in the sense that they all have the same eﬀect
on the gains from industrialization of other ﬁrms. We need enough of them
to industrialize to reduce the price enough so that demand increases enough to
make industrialization worthwhile. In MSV, enough sectors need to industrialize
to increase aggregate income enough so that demand increases enough to make
13industrialization worthwhile. In either case only the number of sectors that
industrialize matters.
One important diﬀerence between MSV and our model is that here we do not
need something like a wage premium to make self-sustaining industrialization
possible. The vertical linkages provide us with a way for one ﬁrm’s industrial-
ization to positively aﬀect the proﬁts of other ﬁrms.
3.2.2 γ 6=1
We now turn to the slightly more complex case where γ 6=1 . Again p(T|B) <













where ι is an indicator function equal to one for j ∈ B and equal to zero
otherwise. Now due to the market size eﬀect, πI(t|B)is decreasing (increasing)
in t if γ is more (less) than unity so that ﬁrms highest (lowest) in the hierarchy
have the greatest incentive to industrialize.
Industrialization of the sectors in the set B shifts up the gains from indus-
trialization of the remaining sectors. Consider what happens in the context
of linkages. Linkages are related to the extent by which industrialization by a
sector aﬀects the proﬁtability of industrialization of sectors above and below
it.10
Proposition 2 When γ<1, backward linkages are stronger than forward link-
ages and proﬁts from industrialization shift up more for low t than high
t. When γ>1, forward linkages are stronger than backward linkages and
proﬁts from industrialization shift up more for high t than low t. When
10If we did away with diﬀerences in market size we would still be left with the question of
what determines the identity of the leading sector.
14γ =1 , both are equally strong and proﬁts from industrialization shift up
in a parallel manner.
Proof When t industrializes, demand increases for things it uses as inputs, i.e.,















These are backward linkages. At the same time demand also increases for















These are forward linkages. When γ =1 , both linkages are equal in
strength and a parallel shift occurs as depicted in Figure 4. If γ>1, then
γT−k >γ T−s and backward linkages are stronger than forward linkages.
Consequently, proﬁts from industrialization shift up more for low t than
high t. If γ<1, then γT−k <γ T−s and forward linkages are stronger than
backward linkages, so that proﬁts from industrialization shift up more for
high t than low t. T h ec a s ew h e r eγ>1 is depicted in Figures 5 and 6.
The analogous diagrams can be drawn for γ<1 a n dt h i si sl e f tt ot h e
reader.
The leading sector is the one that reduces p(T|B) the most. When γ 6=1 ,
the magnitude of the reduction in p(T|B) depends not only on the number of
sectors industrialized but also on which sectors have industrialized.
15Proposition 3 When γ>1 the sector with the lowest index which has not
already industrialized is the leading sector. When γ<1, the sector with
the highest index which has not yet industrialized, is the leading sector.
When γ =1 , all sectors are leading sectors.
Proof From equation (12) it is easy to see that the fall in the price of the ﬁnal
good due to industrialization of Sector t is proportional to aγT−t. When
γ>1,a γ T−t is largest for the lowest t, while for γ<1,a γ T−t is largest for
t = T. When γ =1 ,a γ T−t is constant. When γ>1 the ampliﬁcation of a
cost reduction is forward, to higher t, so that the leading sector being the
one with the smallest index makes sense. When γ<1 the ampliﬁcation of
a cost reduction is backward, to lower t, so that the leading sector being
the one with the largest index again makes sense.
4 The Case for Subsidizing Industrialization
Why does the market not ensure that the optimal extent of industrialization
occurs? There are two distortions in our model. First, producers maximize
proﬁts, rather than welfare that includes both producer surplus and consumer
surplus. In our model we set things up so that in the ﬁrst period of industrial-
ization, there are no consumer surplus gains and the producer appropriates all
the gains. From the second period onward, there are no producer surplus gains,
only consumer surplus ones. Note that if it is not proﬁtable to industrialize,
then the ﬁrst period losses must be made up by later gains in consumer surplus
for industrialization to be worth subsidizing through this channel alone.
The second and less standard distortion has to do with the fact that there
are positive spillovers from industrialization across sectors which industrializing
ﬁrms cannot appropriate. Since price of the ﬁnal good falls in the period after
any sector industrializes, derived demand, and hence, the proﬁts from indus-
16trialization shift up for all un-industrialized sectors. This makes for too little
industrialization.
What can we say about optimal policy? We can begin by noting that if
there is a case for subsidizing industrialization, then the optimal way of doing
so must involve subsidizing the leading sector among the ones that are not
industrialized. Why? By deﬁnition, the leading sector has the greatest positive
externality on the proﬁts of other sectors so the beneﬁts of its industrializing
are highest. Moreover, as it is the most proﬁtable, the subsidy needed to induce
industrialization is at its lowest.
So suppose one proceeded to subsidize in this fashion, targeting the lead-
ing sector that is not industrialized. Could such a policy ever stimulate self-
sustaining industrialization? If so, then the government need just subsidize to
this point, conﬁdent that complete industrialization would follow automatically.
We focus on the case where γ>1. T h ec a s ew h e r eγ<1 is analogous. Let
πI(n|[0,n)) denote the proﬁts obtained by ﬁrm n from industrializing when all
sectors from 0 up to but not including n have industrialized. As n rises to n1
and further to n2 more and more industrialization occurs as depicted in Figure
5. This reduces the price of the ﬁnal good and this channel shifts πI(n|[0,n))
upward. But, as n rises we are also moving along a downward sloping curve
which reduces πI(n|[0,n)).I n F i g u r e 5 t h es h i f ti nt h ec u r v eo v e r c o m e st h e




In the Appendix we show that for (13) to be true, we need θ>γ T+1.I n
other words, θ must be large, i.e., industrialization must result in substantial
cost savings. If πI(n|(n,T]) becomes positive for n<T,t h e ni fag o v e r n m e n t
subsidizes industrialization up to this point, it will become self sustaining and
17proceed without further government help. The initial losses from industrializa-
tion could be covered by later proﬁts. Figure 6 depicts the case where θ<γ T+1
and the movement along the curve dominates. As a result, it is not possible for
initial losses from industrialization to be covered by later proﬁts.
We leave it to the reader to draw the ﬁgures analogous to Figure 5 and 6
when γ<1. When γ<1, then the leading sector is sector T. Industrialization
should start downstream. Proﬁts shift up and are higher downstream. For the
s h i f tu pi np r o ﬁts to dominate the fact that the leading sector is moving up








Assume that industrialization is not proﬁtable to begin with and construct
the welfare that obtains from subsidizing n sectors in the optimal manner. This
involves targeting the leading sector that has not yet industrialized in each of n
consecutive periods. Since γ>1, we would wish to start with sector 0.11
Welfare is deﬁned to be the welfare of the aggregate consumer. Let V (1,P,I)
denote the indirect utility function of this consumer as a function of the price
of the ﬁnal good Z, which is unity as it takes one unit of labor to make it, the
ﬁnal good, T, denoted by P, and his income, I.12 Suppose, for example, that
B industries have industrialized and t is industrializing. Then P = P(T/B)
and I = L+πI(t/B), the sum of labor income and the proﬁts of industrializing
ﬁrms excluding subsidies. Subsidies to ﬁrms are just transfers and cancel out in
11Once again, the arguments for γ<1 are analogous and left to the reader.
12Recall that there are two goods, Z,a n dT,a n dt h ep r i c eo fZ is unity.
18calculating national income. Hence, welfare is merely13
V (1,P(T/B),L+ πI(t/B)).
There are two possibilities where welfare is slightly diﬀerent. Either there is
no possibility of self-sustaining industrialization, i.e., γT+1 >θ>1 or there is,
i.e., θ>γ T+1 > 1. Consider the former case where self-sustaining industrializa-
tion is not possible. Suppose the government subsidizes the leading sector for
n periods, i.e., it subsidizes the ﬁrst n sectors in sequence for n periods. In any
of these periods, indirect utility may be higher or lower than without industri-
alization. Income may fall below L if proﬁts are negative, which pulls indirect
utility down. However, as the price of the ﬁnal good is lower, indirect utility is
pulled up. From t = n onwards, prices are constant at P(T/B = {s : s<n })
w h i c hi sl e s st h a nP(T) while income is L. Hence, indirect utility is higher than
it would have been without industrialization.
Now what needs to be added if self-sustaining industrialization is possible?
Not much! If self-sustaining industrialization occurs once sectors up to k have
been industrialized, then if n<k ,there is nothing to be added. If n ≥ k then
we just need to realize that industrialization will keep on going. The outcome
is exactly that with n = T +1, i.e., when the government subsidizes all sectors.
Thus, if γT+1 >θ ,or θ>γ T+1 and n<k ,then welfare when n sectors

















V (1,V (1,P(T/B = {s : s<n− 1}),L).
13It is clear that income is just labor income, L,p l u sa n yn e tp r o ﬁts since subsidies cancel
out.
19If θ>γ T+1 and n ≥ k, then

















V (1,V (1,P(T/B = {s : s<T}),L).
In general there is no reason to expect W(n) to be concave or for a simple
policy to be optimal. However, there are a few things we can say about welfare.
Proposition 4 If δ is close to unity, then subsidizing industrialization is welfare
improving even when it is not privately proﬁtable. If δ is close to zero,
then it is not.
Proof As δ approaches unity, the second term in (15) or (16) goes to inﬁnity.
As δ approaches zero, the losses in current income from industrialization
can never be made up.
It is hard to say what the optimal extent of subsidization is. However, it
is clear that subsidizing n leading sectors in sequence must raise welfare if δ is
large enough.
Proposition 5 For each n, there exists a δ(n),s u c ht h a tf o rδ>δ (n),i ti s
better to subsidize n leading sectors in sequence than to do nothing.
Proof This follows from the fact that the ﬁrst term in (15) or (16) can be
negative while the second term must be positive and raising δ raises the
(unbounded above) weight put on the second term.
Thus, one can make a case for industrialization when it is not privately
proﬁtable without relying solely on the welfare gains emanating from lower
prices of the ﬁnal good post industrialization.
205C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
Our aim in this paper has been to formalize in a simple way the concept of
unbalanced growth. Models like the simple one given here can help cast light
on the old debate about paths to industrialization. It suggests that in a closed
economy, when the future is not discounted too highly, there is a case for subsi-
dizing industrialization. Other things equal, the sector whose industrialization
has the largest impact on the cost of making the ﬁnal good is the sector to
target.
We hope in future work to look at more general settings and at issues like the
role of trade. Through trade some of the beneﬁts to industrialization of a sector
accrue to the rest of the world suggesting that there may be a case for coordi-
nating industrialization world wide and for the subsidization of industrialization
at an international level.
6 Appendix: Conditions for Self-Reinforcing In-
dustrialization
























γT+1 − θ − (1 − θ)γT−n+1
θ(γ − 1)
. (19)
















1. This in turn allows us to write the price of the ﬁnal good as the cost of the
21implicit requirement of the nth good, γT−np(n|[0,n)), plus the labor requirement
from then on,
γT−n−1
γ−1 . This is what gives us (19).











p(T|[0,n)) rises, then the numerator rises while the denominator falls so that























(1 − θ)γT−n+1 lnγ
θ(γ − 1)
< 0










> 0, i.e., θ>γ T+1,t h e nπI(n|[0,n)) rises with n.
As n rises more industrialization occurs. This reduces the price of the ﬁnal
good and this channel raises the proﬁts from industrializing at n. Also, as n
rises γT−n falls for γ>1. This channel reduces πI(n|[0,n)).W i t hγ>1,t h i s
movement along the πI(t|[0,n)) curve reduces proﬁts as πI(t|[0,n)) is falling
in t. From this it follows that increasing industrialization from below when
γ>1 entails conﬂicting forces. If θ>γ T+1, then the former dominates so that
πI(t|[0,n)) rises with n.
























θγT+1 +( 1− θ)γT−n − 1
θ(γ − 1)
.






γT−n−1 + ... +1
¢
units of labor. This gives us the
above expression.
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